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Since the decision of the Court of Appeal in the Romalpa case in the 
mid 1970's' there has been an ever growing use of reservation of property 
(Romalpa) clauses in commercial contracts for the sale of goods. The concept 
of a reservation of property clause is grounded in sections 19 and 21 of the 
Sale of Goods Act 1908 but its widespread use is a recent phenomenon2. 
The problem to be addressed here concerns the relationship of such clauses 
to the Chattels Transfer Act 1924. The question is whether such clauses fall 
within the ambit of the definition in section 2 of the Chattels Transfer Act 
of "instrument" or the exclusions from the term "instrument". If they fall 
within the latter then they are exempt from the registration provisions of 
the Chattels Transfer Act. If this is so, it enables those purchasing on such 
terms to give a misleading impression of their substance to other creditors 
who may extend credit facilities in reliance on what appears to be ownership 
by the purchaser of substantial stock in trade. In the event of the purchaser's 
bankruptcy, the supplier under a contract containing a reservation of property 
clause can recover his goods possibly leaving very little property to be realised 
for the benefit of the unsecured creditors3. 
11. ROMALPA CLAUSES 
What, then, is a reservation of property or Romalpa clause? A distinction 
must be drawn between simple and complex clauses. The simple clause reserves 
the property in the goods sold until they are paid for. It thus enables a supplier 
to reclaim the goods. The complex clause purports to extend to proceeds 
of sub sales or to new goods produced using the goods sold and other goods 
as components. Combined with an equitable right to trace, such a clause 
can be a powerful weapon4. 
' Aluminium Industrie Vaassen v Romalpa Aluminium Limited [I9761 2 All E.R.552. 
Formerly it was found only in the form of the conditional sale type of hire purchase agreement 
and in export sales. 
3 See "Reservation of title clauses and the assertion of beneficial ownership in proceeds in England 
and New Zealand" by Peter Watts published in (1986) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 456. 
In an appendix to his original unpublished paper Peter Watts examined the relationship of 
the Romalpa clause with the Chattels Transfer Act. When considering reservation of property 
clauses it is of interest to reflect on the doctrine of "reputed ownership" under section 61 
(c) Bankruptcy Act 1908 which was abolished by the Insolvency Act 1967. The essence of 
the doctrine was that property which did not belong to the bankrupt could vest in the Official 
Assignee, if the goods were held by the bankrupt in circumstances in which it was reasonable 
to infer that they were owned by him. 
See Len Vidgen Ski & Leisure Limited v Timaru Marine Supplies (1982) Limited(In receivership) 
(1985) 2 NZCLC 99, Hendy Lennox Industrial Engines Limited v Grahame Patrick Limited 
[I9841 2 All E.R.152 and Re AndrabeN Limited in liquidation [I9841 3 All E.R.407. 
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The principles of the Romalpa case have been recognised as a part of the 
law of New Zealand by the High Court in Len Vidgen Ski & Leisure Limited 
v llmaru Marine Supplies (1982) Limited (In receivership) (1985) 2 N.Z.C.L.C. 
99. 
The Chattels Transfer Act defines the term "instrument" in a detailed way 
and in part by way of exclusion. Unfortunately the Chattels Transfer Act 
is not the only Act in New Zealand which governs security over chattels. 
Where the borrower is a limited liability company incorporated under the 
Companies Act 1955, registration of charges over its chattels has to be performed 
in the office of the Registrar of Companies. This is because section 2 of the 
Chattels Transfer Act excludes from the definition of instrument debentures 
issued by any company and secured upon the chattels of such company and 
mortgages or charges granted or created by a company. To be registrable 
under the Companies Act, the particular charge must fall within the nine 
categories of charge set out in section 102 of that Acts. 
IV. REGISTRATION UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT 1955 
(a) Simple Reservation of Property Clauses 
It can immediately be stated that a simple reservation of property clause 
will not be registrable under the Companies Act because such a clause is 
not a "charge" within the definition of section 102. In England the Court 
of Appeal in Clough Mill Limited v Martin [I9841 3 All E.R. 982 has taken 
the view that such clauses are effective and do not amount to registrable 
charges. 
(b) Complex Reservation of Property Clauses 
A complex clause which purports to attach to mixed goods may amount 
to a fixed equitable charge or a floating charge. In Re Bond Worth [I9831 
Ch. 228 a complex clause which allowed the buyer to sell the mixed goods 
was held to be a floating charge. As such in New Zealand it should be registered 
under section 102 (2)(d) of the Act. In the absence of such a power, the 
interest reserved may properly be a chattel security and registrable under section 
102 (2)(c) (Borden (UK) Limited v Scottish Timber Products Limited [I98 11 
Ch. 25). 
In terms of the Chattels Transfer Act, we need to have regard to the definitions 
of chattels and instrument in section 2. "Chattels" are defined as "any personal 
property that can be completely transferred by delivery and . . . includes . . . 
book debts". "Instrument" is defined to mean and include inter alia (paragraph 
See D.W. McLauchlan: "Corporate personal property secured transactions - Chattels Transfer 
Act, Companies Act or neither?" (1978) NZLJ 137. There are certain instruments registrable 
under the Chattels Transfer Act 1924 when entered into by companies incorporated under 
the Companies Act 1955. These instruments are hire purchase agreements, chattel leases and 
absolute assignments of book debts. These transactions fall within the ambit of the Chattels 
Transfer Act but they do not amount to charges under the Companies Act. 
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f) "any agreement, whether intended to be followed by the execution of any 
other instrument or not, by which a right in equity to any chattels, or to 
any charge or security thereon or thereover, is conferred". 
All transfers of chattels in the ordinary course of business of any trade 
or calling are excluded from the definition of instrument in section 2 of the 
Act. 
(a) Complex Reservation of Property Clauses 
Plainly, from the definition of chattels, complex clauses may be registrable 
in that the attachment to the proceeds of the sale of goods may amount 
to a charge on book debts and as such would be registrable under the Act. 
Aside from the proceeds of the sale of goods, we must ask what the position 
is with regard to attachment to the goods themselves after they have become 
mixed. The definition of chattels refers to "transfer by delivery". Attachment 
to mixed goods involves attachment to future or after acquired assets. In 
Bruce v McCluskey (1895) 21 VLR 262 it was stated at 265 and 266 that 
"after acquired property does not fall within that definition. The very nature 
of the term indicates that such property is not capable of delivery because 
it is not in existence and is not contemplated to exist until some time after 
the bill of sale shall have been executed". Perhaps then complex clauses in 
so far as they purport to attach to mixed goods are not registrable because 
such goods are not "chattels" within the meaning of the Act. 
The grant over future acquired chattels confers an equitable interest upon 
the grantee, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary. Paragraph 
(f) of the definition of instrument in section 2 refers to rights in equity. How 
do these provisions in section 2 concerning the definition of chattels and the 
definition of instrument stand together? The provision concerning the definition 
of instrument follows the English Bills of Sale Act 1878. This provision, though 
obviously extending to an equitable charge over presently existing property, 
has not been regarded as overthrowing the rule that a bill of sale must be 
one of chattels capable of transfer by delivery at time of execution as held 
in Thomas v Kelly (1888) 13 AC 50 and in Re John Coles & Son (1936) 
ABC 52. In South Australia the legislation follows the same wording though 
with slight modification to the phraseology. There the case of Re Grezzand 
seems to suggest that an assurance of future property is registrable as a bill 
of sale. This proposition is clearly in conflict with Re John Coles & Son 
(supra), a later decision of the same judge. It may be that the true explanation 
of Re Grezzana is that there the instrument was registered as a bill of sale 
u 
and the court decided that the inclusion of crops to be grown in the future 
did not render it void - quite a different matter. 
In New Zealand there are limited urovisions in the Chattels Transfer Act 
which authorise the taking of security over after acquired chattels. There are 
the provisions concerning crops, stock and wool; there is the proviso to section 
24; most importantly there is section 26 of the Act as amended in 1974 which 
specifically authorises the taking of security over after acquired chattels in 
the form of stock in trade. The relevant provision states that nothing in section 
23, which requires instruments to have an inventory of chattels, or section 
24, which, subject to its proviso, precludes the taking of security over after 
acquired chattels, shall render an instrument void in respect of any chattels 
(1932) 4 A.B.C. 216. 
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which the grantor under an instrument by way of security is required by 
the instrument to hold at his premises pending sale if the chattels are of such 
a nature or are so described as to be reasonably capable of identification 
and the grantor is engaged in the business of selling or letting out on hire 
chattels of that kind. Significantly, sub-section 2 of section 26 enables security 
to be extended to proceeds of sale of stock in trade to the extent that such 
proceeds are expressly stated in the instrument to form part of the security 
and to the extent that such proceeds are kept by or on behalf of the grantor 
in a separate and identifiable fund. The amendment to section 26 permitting 
the taking of security over stock in trade overcomes the difficulties otherwise 
created by the definition of "chattels", as regards sale proceeds but not as 
far as mixed goods are concerned. The matter awaits judicial clarification. 
(b) Simple Reservation of Property Clauses 
It is arguable that neither simple nor complex reservation of property clauses 
come within the definition of registrable instruments within section 2 of the 
Chattels Transfer Act because they may be regarded as transfers of chattels 
in the ordinary course of business of a trade or calling. This immediately 
raises the question of how the courts have defined "the ordinary course of 
business" over the years and whether such definition accommodates simple 
reservation of property clauses. 
VI. THE ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS 
Halsbury's Laws of England7 states that whether a transfer is in the ordinary 
course of business must necessarily depend on the facts of a particular case 
and on business practice prevailing at the relevant time. Hence previous cases 
dealing with transfers in the ordinary course of business cannot be taken to 
lay down any absolute or unchangeable rule, as what may then have been 
a transfer in the ordinary course of business may have ceased to be normal 
through a change of business practice and transfers at one time regarded 
as outside the ordinary course of business may now be considered to be within 
it. 
In New Zealand the Court of Appeal considered the term relative to chattels 
securities in Williams and Kettle Limited v f ie  Official Assignee of Harding 
(1908) 27 NZLR 871. The facts of this case bear examination. W. & K. Ltd, 
a firm of auctioneers, sold stock to H., a stock dealer, on the 12th, 18th 
and 23rd of July 1907. On the 9th of August 1907, in response to requests 
by W. & K. Ltd to reduce his account of £1,171, H. wrote to them as follows, 
"On looking over my account I find I owe you a considerable amount and 
as I have 200 cattle grazing at Ongaonga which were bought through you, 
I am giving you the sole right to them. The amount the cattle cost is between 
£1,000 and £1,100. I only ask that I be allowed to jockey the cattle off through 
your firm". 
There was no evidence before the court to show whether or not it was 
the custom for stock dealers to give such a letter to auctioneers. 
On the 15th of August H. absconded without paying his debts and this 
came to the notice of W. & K. Ltd on the 21st of August. 
On the 19th of August W. & K. Ltd had given notice to the owner of 
7 Halsbury's Laws of England London 1973 volume 4 page 259. 
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the land on which the cattle referred to in the letter were grazing, that he 
was not to deliver the cattle to anyone without their instructions. On the 
20th W. & K. Ltd obtained possession of the cattle and on the 21st removed 
them. 
On the 5th of September H. was adjudicated a bankrupt, with the bankruptcy 
relating back to the 15th of August. 
The Official Assignee proceeded to demand possession of the cattle from 
W. & K. Ltd but the company refused to hand them over. W. & K. Ltd 
subsequently sold the cattle at auction for £903 and the Official Assignee 
claimed this as part of the bankrupt's estate. 
The Court of Appeal held that H.'s letter was an instrument by way of 
security within the meaning of section 2 of the Chattels Transfer Act and 
did not fall within the exceptions concerning transfer in the ordinary course 
of business." 
The court followed the decision of the Privy Council in Tennant v Howatson 
13App.Cas.489. Williams J stated at page 889, "there is no evidence at all 
that the letter was a transfer of stock in the ordinary course of business. 
As was said of the document in question in Tennant v Howatson, the execution 
of such a document may be of frequent occurrence but it is not shown to 
be the common practice and it must be shown to be the common practice 
before it can be said to be a transfer in the ordinary course of business. 
Even if it were shown to be the common practice it does not follow that 
it is in the ordinary course of business. The judgment . . . goes on to say, 
'moreover, . . . it is not easy to say with any precision at all what is meant 
by the expression "the ordinary course of business" ' ". 
We can see then that for a practice to be in the ordinary course of business 
it is not enough that it be a frequent practice or even common practice; it 
must be in the ordinary course of business. Regrettably, the courts do not 
appear to have had a further opportunity for considering the question of 
the ordinary course of business for the purposes of avoiding the registration 
requirements of the Chattels Transfer Act. 
The question of the meaning of the ordinary course of business has, however, 
frequently been considered by the courts in other areas of the law. It has 
been considered with regard to the floating charge in the context of fraudulent 
or voidable preference and it has been considered by the Australian Courts 
under section 122(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 again in the context of 
fraudulent or voidable preference. The Australian legislation is considered 
below. The question must be asked whether the concept of the ordinary course 
of business is a universal concept or whether its meaning varies according 
to the area of the law under which it falls for consideration. Unfortunately, 
this is a matter that the courts have not yet pronounced upon. 
VII. TRANSACTIONS INTHE ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS 
AND FLOATING CHARGES 
Floating charges can be given by limited liability companies incorporated 
under the Companies Act 1955 over their assets in favour of lenders. Only 
such companies can give floating charges. They are frequently granted over 
In the event the instrument by way of security was void under section 79(2) of the Bankruptcy 
Act 1892 as it had been given within four months prior to the bankruptcy. 
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chattels and book debts. Floating charges were first recognised by the courts 
in 1870 when the English Court of Appeal in Chancery gave its decision 
in Re Panama, New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Co (1870) 5 Ch.App. 
318. The nature of the floating charge was described by Lord Macnaghten 
in Government Stock Investment Co v Manila Railway Co [I8971 A.C.81, 
86 and in Illingworth v Houldsworth [I9041 A.C. 35. 
Today the three fundamental characteristics of the floating charge are 
recognised to be as follows: 
1. The floating charge is a charge on a class of assets of a company present 
and future. 
2. The items making up the class of assets change in the ordinary course 
of business from time to time. 
3. Until some future step is taken by or on behalf of the chargee the company 
may carry on its business in the ordinary way (Re Yorkshire Woolcombers 
Association Limited [I9031 2 Ch. at 295). 
The company then, gives a charge over its assets, perhaps its stock in trade, 
and is permitted by the terms of the floating charge to deal in its stock in 
trade, in the ordinary course of business, without such dealing amounting 
to a breach of the charge on the part of the company. The charge is therefore 
defeasible by a transaction in the ordinary course of businessg. Should a 
transaction not be in the ordinary course of business it may amount to a 
voidable or fraudulent   reference. 
How have the court; defined the term "in the ordinary course of business" 
in this context? 
The term was used in Rust v Cooper (1777) 98E.R.1277.1280 by Lord 
Mansfield. In Ex parte Blackburn Re Cheesebrough (1 871) L.R. 12Eq.358.363 
Bacon V.C. as Chief Judge in Bankruptcy referred to the honouring of bills 
of exchange presented at their maturity, the payment of debts which have 
become due in the usual and customarv manner and Davments made in 
* - 
fulfilment of a contract engagement to pay in a particular manner or at a 
particular time as being in the ordinary course of business. He went on to 
refer to "the most ordinary everyday transactions of commerce". 
Specific transactions recognised by the courts as in the ordinary course 
of business for the purpose of the floating charge are, in summary, sales, 
leases, mortgages, charges, liens, payment of debts and other transactions 
effected with a view to carrying on the concernlo. A fraudulent transaction 
will not be treated as in the ordinary course of business (Williams v Quebrada 
Co [I8951 2Ch.751). In determining a particular company's business the courts 
will consult its Memorandum and Articles of Association (Re Old Bush Mills 
Distillery Company [I8971 I.R.488). In Reynolds Brothers (Motors) Pty Limited 
and Others v Esanda Limited" it was held that the power of a company 
to deal with its assets free of a floating charge is a wide power. The court 
found that there are limits to that power but judged it unnecessary to attempt 
to mark out those limits in that case because the transaction in question fell 
within the relevant principle. At page 1341 Priestley J.A. stated that transactions 
9 See "Company Charges" by W.J. Gough, London 1978. 
'0 See Halsbury's Laws of England London 1973 volume 7, page 490. 
" (1982-83) ACLC 1, 333. 
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would undoubtedly be in the ordinary course of business if, within its course, 
they are made for the purpose of carrying on the business or to achieve ends 
not disparate from those of the business activity. 
In the Reynolds Brothers case (supra), it was held that a transaction for 
the purpose of maintaining the company as a going concern is within the 
ordinary course of business even though the transaction may be exceptional 
in nature. In so holding the court relied on Re Borax (1901) 1 Ch.326 and 
Re Willmott (1886) 34 Ch.D.147. Exceptional matters would have to be intra 
vires (Re Borax supra). It seems strange to propose that something exceptional 
could be in the ordinary course of business but the authority for the proposition 
remains. In this connection it is of interest to note that in Re Old Bush Mills 
Distillery Company Limited (supra) Lord Ashbourne at page 495 thought 
the word "ordinary" had "no place properly at all in the phrase". 
VIII. TRANSACTIONS INTHE ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS AND 
SECTION 122(2)(a) BANKRUPTCY ACT 1966 (AUSTRALIA) 
This provision in Australia is the equivalent of section 56 of New Zealand's 
Insolvency Act 1967. There are significant differences between the two 
provisions and it must be noted that 
(a) there is no requirement of "a view to giving . . . a preference" under the 
Australian Act, 
(b) there is no voidable preference under the Australian Act where the 
purchaser, payee or encumbrancer of the bankrupt 
(1) acts in the ordinary course of business or 
(2) acts in good faith and for valuable consideration. 
These differences in the legislation must be borne in mind when considering 
the approach of the Australian Courts to the term "the ordinary course of 
business" under section 122(2)(a). 
What then have the Australian Courts made of theq term? Predictably as 
Kennedy J. put it in Katoa Pty Limited v Dartnall(1983) 8 A.C.L.R.476,480, 
the dividing line between what falls within the ordinary course of business 
and what does not is not easily defined in any particular case. 
There is a line of cases which suggests that in determining whether a 
transaction is in the ordinary course of business, the general standard of conduct 
in the business community must be applied as distinct from that which is 
pursued in a particular trade or a particular course of dealing between the 
debtor and creditor in questionl2. Equally, there are other cases that suggest 
the view that the transaction must be seen against the commercial background 
of the particular trade of the debtor and creditorl3. 
In one case the court equated acting in the ordinary course of business 
with acting in accordance with the standards of honesty and fairness which 
are ordinarily accepted by the business communityl4. In another case the court 
stated that the term "means that the transaction must fall into place as part 
'2 Robertson v Grigg (1932) 47 CLR 257, Burns v McFarlane (1940) 64 CLR 108.125 and Taylor 
v White (1964) 110 CLR 129 at 136, 142, 151 and 159. 
' 3  Re Lee Furniture Pry Limited (1983) 8 ACLR251., Downs Distributing Co Ply Limited v 
Associated Blue Star Stores Pty Limited (1947) 76 CLR 463. 
l 4  Taylor v White (1964) 110 CLR 129.159. 
Romalpa Clauses and Section 2 of the Chattels Danger Act 289 
of the undistinguished common flow of business done, that it should form 
part of the ordinary course of business carried on, calling for no remark 
and arising out of no special or particular situation".l5 
It is difficult to determine from the Australian cases a clear definition of 
the term "the ordinary course of business". The courts have been anxious 
to produce a just result on the facts before them in individual cases and the 
facts of the individual case will govern whether or not a practice is regarded 
as in the ordinary course of business. 
IX. Is  A RESERVATION OF PROPERTY CLAUSE IN "THE ORDINARY 
COURSE OF BUSINESS? 
Drawing on these analogies, can it then be said that a reservation of property 
clause amounts to a transfer of chattels in the ordinary course of business 
of a trade or calling, thereby taking the document in which it is to be found 
out of the class of instruments requiring registration under the Chattels Transfer 
Act? The short answer, of course, is that there is no authority on the point 
and that the question must stand for the time being. 
From the cases set out above we can determine how the courts have 
approached this concept down the years. Of particular note is Williams and 
Kettle Limited v The Official Assignee of Harding (supra) with its emphasis 
on the ordinary course of business. 
Plainly, in any given case, the decision of the court is going to be based 
on a finding of fact, dependent in itself on the evidence presented to the 
court. The question is going to be one of whether the use of reservation 
of property clauses has become so widespread that they can be said to be 
in the ordinary course of business. To determine the extent of the use of 
such clauses in the New Zealand business community today calls for statistical 
research. Of interest are the comments of Mr Mike Whale, and Mr Peter 
Howell co-Leaders of the 1987 N.Z. Law Society Seminar entitled "Recent 
Developments in Insolvency Law and Practice" and co-authors of the 
accompanying manual of the same name, made during the Christchurch session 
of the seminar. During the course of their address, the seminar leaders 
commented that the use of reservation of property clauses had become so 
widespread in this country that the N.Z. Society of Accountants was considering 
how to cope with them in the context of its recommended procedures for 
the preparation of balance sheets and financial statements. Chartered 
Accountants are conscious of their liability for the production of accurate 
records and are increasingly faced with the problem in insolvency of finding 
that stock in trade they had thought was the property of the now insolvent 
party, is in fact the property of a supplier who has reserved the property 
in it to himself as a condition of the contract of sale. This in itself raises 
the question of the necessity of some public notice procedure concerning the 
existence of such clauses but it also indicates that their use has already become 
common in New Zealand and perhaps "ordinary" in the sense that they are 
in the ordinary course of business. If that is so then they are within the exceptions 
from the requirement of registration under the Chattels Transfer Act. .. 
l 5  Downs Distributing Co Pty Limited v Associated Blue Star Stores Pry Limited (1947) 76 
CLR 463 at 477. 
Appendix: Minnesota sentencing guidelines grid 
IST DEGREE 
CONDUCT - ZND DEGREE 
SIMPLE ROBBERY 
This is a shghtly modified version of the Minnesota sentencing grid. The full grid can he found at <http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/index.htm> 
NOTES 
The sol~d numbers in each 
cell represent presumptive 
sentences in months. The 
ltalicised numbers denote the 
range within which the judge 
may sentence without the 
sentence being deemed a 
departure. The judge is allowed 
to depart from the range to 
reflect the particular 
circumstances of the case, and 
subject to appeal. 
Presumptive immediate 
commitment to state 
priso5 FkrsLDegree Murder is 
excluded from the gmdelines by 
law and continues to have a 
mandatory life sentence. 
Presumptive stayed 
sentence (generally a 
disposition slmilar to a 
suspended sentence for the 
durat~on indicated in the box. 
Conditions may be imposed). 
